I. Introduction
Choosing an appropriate distribution channel structure is a problem of concern to marketing practitioners and academics alike. Some modelers have recently turned to game theory techniques to understand the effect of competition on channel choice. We contribute to this literature by synthesizing earlier approaches in a model with consistent assumptions about within-and between-channel competitive behavior. The synthesis is significant in that it overturns some results found in earlier work, and suggests new directions for further research.
One competitive model of channel choice is posited by McGuire and Staelin (1983) , who focus on competition between two manufacturers of competitive products. They show that the relative profitability of using independent middlemen (i.e., delegation), rather than vertically integrating (i.e., centralizing) the channel, is a positive function of the degree of demand substitutability in the market. This paper has inspired many other pieces further examining the channel choices of multiple manufacturers, including Coughlan (1985) , Moorthy (1986) , and McGuire and Staelin (1986) .
Another stream in the channels modeling literature in marketing, also involving the use of game theory, concentrates on single-manufacturer channel models of competition and cooperation. An early piece here is by Jeuland and Shugan (1983) , who argue that coordination in a marketing channel is the optimal behavior. They further discuss many ways in which coordination can occur, only one of which is via contractual vertical integration. This paper, too, has been a foundation for several subsequent pieces, such as Shugan (1985) , Moorthy (1987) , and Jeuland and Shugan (1 988).
Indeed, this growing body of literature is so well-established that it is entering the discussion in at least one textbook on channels (Stern and El-Ansary 1988) . Despite this evidence of "maturation" in the area, we find two basic problems with the conceptualization of these models. As is frequently the case when a field of modeling advances, these problems lie in some implicit modeling assumptions: first, that intra-channel agreements are limited either in the form of transfer pricing used or the ability to reformulate the agreements; and second, that all intra-channel agreements are observable to competitors.
In particular, the channel choice literature with multiple-manufacturer competition restricts the contract between a manufacturer and his middleman to a constant per-unit fee. But the literature concentrating on within-channel competition and coordination has shown that more complex transfer pricing ( a quantity discount in Jeuland and Shugan 1983, or a two-part tariff in Moorthy 1987) can increase channel profitability by causing each channel member to act to maximize total channel profits, rather than just his own profits. We seek to synthesize these two approaches by considering the robustness of their results to the simultaneous consideration of multi-manufacturer competition and more sophisticated within-channel transfer pricing policies.
We show that the relationship between optimal channel structure and product substitutability found in the multi-manufacturer modeling stream is not robust to the incorporation of two-part transfer pricing (a fixed fee plus a per-unit price) in the channel. In particular, the optimal fixed fee is not zero, so that two-part transfer prices are more profitable than one-part prices. Further, when two-part pricing is considered, the equilibrium relationship between channel structure and demand substitutability found in the earlier literature breaks down. Instead, we find that the equilibrium channel structure is always delegated, and that more vertical middleman levels always enhance profitability. This result holds independent of the demand relationship of the products (substitutes or complements), and even holds independent of market structure at the manufacturing and middleman levels (two versus many competitors). The result is valid under either price competition or quantity competition.' Further, it is not dependent on linear demand; all that is required is a unique optimum of the channel profit function.
This modeling result, however, appears to be a mathematical abstraction, since we never see distribution channels in the real world with infinite numbers of middleman levels! One could attempt to reconcile this equilibrium prediction with reality by contending that two-part transfer pricing schemes are difficult for practitioners to think of or to implement, and that the one-part schemes assumed in the earlier literature are therefore appropriate. But this contention, too, would contradict reality. Two-part pricing is a familiar fixture in contracts between manufacturers and their franchisees, for in~tance.~ However, there is one further implicit assumption in all the prior modeling literature which turns out to be crucial: that all intra-channel agreements or contracts are observable to competitors. Specifically, no sub rosa renegotiation within a channel is permitted, and delegation is assumed to be credible. But this assumption is very restrictive. Firms clearly do not know everything going on in a competitor's channel, and further, channel members have a profit incentive to secretly renegotiate their price or quantity commitment^.^ Once ' The assumption of price competition implies that there are no capacity constraints facing the firm; clearly, this is not always an appropriate assumption. In the automobile and fashion apparel industries, for example, manufacturers must commit to a predetermined level of production, which is not instantaneously adjustable. In these cases, strategic competition may well be better represented by quantity choices than price choices.
For example, as of 1980, Burger King charged a new franchisee a one-time fixed franchise fee of $40,000, and ongoing fees as a percentage of the franchisee's sales: 3.5% as royalty, 4% for the marketing fund, and (if the franchisor owned the land on which the franchise was built), 8.5% as rent. McDonald's had a similar arrangement in 1980, with a fixed fee of $12,500, a royalty of 390, a marketing fee of 3%, and rent of 8.5% (Smith 1980) .
The notion that competing channels do not know all relevant information about each other is both intuitively we relax the observability assumption, our unrealistic predction of infinite channel length disappears. Now, regardless of the external structure of the channel, the unique equilibrium is characterized by prices and quantities equal to those in the integrated, or centralized, case. Delegation thus has no impact on channelprofits. This result arises simply because of noncooperative behavior in the distribution channel context. We view the incorporation of more general transfer pricing arrangements and obsemability (or the lack thereof) into the model structure as crucial. We see the contribution of this modeling as twofold. First, it improves upon existing channels models by accounting for additional profit incentives that can be expected to motivate competitive behavior. But second, and perhaps more important, incorporating this more complete array of incentives into the model shows that this paradigm alone does not suffice to explain distribution channel choice. While this seems a negative conclusion, our final goal is to indicate promising avenues for future research (both theoretical and empirical) in the channels structure area.
We discuss the ideas and results of the paper intuitively and generally in $2, and illustrate them with detailed examples in Appendix 11. In $3, we allow many vertical levels, and in $4 we look at the assumption of contract observability. We close with suggestions for future research.
General Results
Suppose that you (firm 1) and another firm (firm 2) compete on price. For any price you set, there is a price p2(pl) which maximizes the profits of firm 2. Similarly, for any p2, YOU have a preferred p1(p2). The price pair (pf ,pS) satisfying both of these reaction functions simultaneously is the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Suppose now that you could commit to a price before firm 2 sets its price, instead of playing Nash. In this case, you would be able to induce firm 2 to set any pz that you desire simply by committing to the appropriate p l ;firm 2 still sets its price according to the response function p2(p1 ). Naturally, you would pick some price which gives you the highest profits, and this point is generally not the Nash equilibrium. The point of this is that you can increase your profits by announcing to your competitor that you have hired an agent to play for you, that the agent is compensated such that he will select p", ,and that you are leaving town (and hence will not secretly renegotiate the ~o n t r a c t ) .~
A. Two Manufacturers and Many Retailers
Let us assume for the moment that the market structure is a duopoly at the manufacturing level, but competitive and atomistic at the retail level. A duopoly might be sustainable at the manufacturing level because the incumbents have an enduring h e d cost advantage over potential entrants (including any retailers contemplating upstream integration) which effectively blockades entry. However, manufacturers can retail (i.e., centralize), albeit at a fixed cost disadvantage. Now, let the manufacturers play a three-stage price game. In stage one, they decide whether or not to play through retail agents. Those who decentralize auction off retailing rights for a price including some fixed fee and some per-unit transfer price in the second stage.5 In the third stage, all retail prices are set. Given the market structure, both cenreasonable and commonly used by modelers; it is, for example, evident in Shugan and Jeuland's (1988) arguments about the durability of channel structures.
In game theoretic terms, you get the ability to commit or become a Stackelberg leader by playing through an agent (see also Fershtman and Judd 1987) .
We are grateful to Abel Jeuland for poirrting out that we need to assume that the contract includes quality specifications.
tralized and decentralized manufacturers extract all economic rents for their products; thus, delegation gives the manufacturer a cost-free way to comnnii and become a Stackelberg leader relative to manufacturers who do not delegate. From this, we arrive at:
LEMMA. It 1' s never a subgame perfect equilibrium for nojirm to delegate.
PROOF. See Appendix I. But this is only part of the story. Suppose that firm 1 has delegated, and now consider the situation from the perspective of firm 2. If firm 2 does not delegate, we end up at a price pair (p",,p"2) characterizing the intersection of the reaction functions of agent 1 and firm 2. Can firm 2 do even better by also delegating? The answer is yes. Note that if firm 2 does not delegate, then delegation by firm 1 commits firm i's retail agent to a reaction function p",(p2). Firm 2's retail price choice is then essentially set, since a delegating firm 1 knows firm 2's best response and optimizes against it. But by also delegating, firm 2 can avoid this follower role and gets the ability to select a clever reaction function itself. Of course, firm 1 will take this into account when it decides how to compensate its agent. However, this merely increases the attractiveness of firm 2 delegating, because film 2's lower flexibility allows firm 1 to commit to a mutually more beneficial reaction function. We formalize this argument as:
PROPOSITION Both jirms delegate in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
1.
PROOF. See Appendix I. Note that this result does not depend on linearity in the demand function. All it requires is concavity of the profit functions. As for the demand relationship of the products, the results go through exactly analogously for complements in demand as for substitutes. Further, all of the arguments also apply to quantity competition as well as price competition. The arguments for quantity competition between complements resemble those for price competition between substitutes, and those for quantity competition between substitutes resemble those for price competition between complements. With price competition, delegation always raises retail prices, and this raises channel profits for demand substitutes but decreases them for demand complements. With quantity competition, the opposite relationships pertain. Hence, this unique delegation equilibrium implies higher profits than centralization for either ( a ) price competition between substitutes, or (b) quantity competition between complements. But the delegation equilibrium generates lower profits than centralization for ( a ) price competition between complements, or ( b ) quantity competition between substitutes. These latter two cases thus exhibit Prisoner's Dilemma equilibrium characteristic^.^ We illustrate these general results with a linear demand structure in Appendix 11.
B. Many Manufacturers and Two Retailers
While the two-manufacturer, many-retailer situation is certainly found in various markets, other situations are characterized instead by few retailers and many manufacturers (e.g., Sears as a mass merchandise retailer is matched in today's market only by J. C. Penney and perhaps Montgomery Ward, and faces relatively competitive suppliers upstream) . Casual observation has suggested that this important difference in "market power" of the manufacturers implies different equilibrium channels (e.g., Stem and ElAnsary 1988) . We examine this question here by assuming that there are many manufacturers, but only two retailers. A duopoly at the retail level would be sustainable for the same kinds of reasons that a duopoly at the manufacturer level could persist: the two existing retailers have an enduring fixed cost advantage over any potential entrants (in- Bonanno and Vickers (1988) , Lin (1988) , and McGuire and Staelin (1986) prove Proposition 1 for price competition between demand substitutes. Also the results of Gal-Or (1987) depend on these mechanisms.
cluding manufacturers seeking to integrate downstream). In particular, just as we assumed above that retailers could not (e.g., due to fixed cost disadvantages) integrate upstream, in this model we assume symmetrically that manufacturers cannot integrate downstream.' In short, entry to the retail level is blockaded. On the other hand, retailers can manufacture, albeit at a fixed cost disadvantage.
The issue, then, in the previous model was whether or not the duopolistic manufacturers should centralize and perform the retailing function themselves, or delegate it to independent retailers. Here, we look at the symmetric problem: should the duopolistic retailers centralize the manufacturing function, or delegate it to independent manufacturers? To maintain comparability with the model of the previous section, we assume the same arbitrary concave profit function as in the two-manufacturer, many-retailer situation. Now, however, since it is the retailer level which has "market power" due to its duopolistic nature, the retailers can auction off the right of access to the retail market to the manufacturer~.Given a competitive market for manufacturing services, the retailers can auction off these rights at a price (i.e., a fixed fee) equal to the expected equilibrium profits at the manufacturing level. As before, we assume that under delegation, the manufacturing level acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the retail level, and sets constant (linear) transfer prices for the products.
The analysis again assumes the form of a three-stage game. In stage one, the retailers decide whether or not to delegate the manufacturing function. If they delegate, they auction off retail rights and agree on transfer prices with their respective manufacturers in stage two. In stage three, retail prices or quantities are chosen.
To examine the equilibrium of this game, first note that in either price or quantity competition, equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits are exactly the same as in the model with two manufacturers and many retailers. This is because we have assumed the same cost structure, demand structure, and pattern of Stackelberg leadership as in the above model. The only difference is that now, all channel profits accrue to the retail level, rather than to the manufacturing level. It is therefore easy to see that all the results in the above section pertain here as well, in particular:
-delegation permits a retailer to act as a Stackelberg leader relative to its competitor; -profits are higher under delegation than centralization for price competition with substitutes or quantity competition with complements; -profits are lower under delegation than centralization for price competition with complements or quantity competition with substitutes; -delegation by both retailers is the unique perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game, in either price or quantity competition.
C. Two Manufacturers and Two Retailers
Finally, let us consider a market with two manufacturers, two retailers, and blockaded entry at both levels. No sales can take place without retailers as agents, and no product 'This phenomenon of entry bamers caused by cost advantages was observed, for instance, in the semiconductor industry in Europe in the 1960's. American firms seeking to enter the European market did not have the requisite know-how to compete in the European market, and few Europeans had both the know-how to do business in Europe and that to market semiconductor chips and capital equipment. One of these, a man named Helmut Seier, canied an exclusive line of semiconductor capital equipment; if an American producer tried to enter the market, but a competitor had previously entered and gotten Seier to cany its line, the new entrant was virtually barred from entering, because of lack of supply of qualified independent middlemen to handle its products.
This means that any manufacturer which does not "win the auction" in effect has no access to the retail market, and therefore does not produce. A duopoly is thus preserved at the retail level, because of our assumption of blockaded entry to the retail level. This is a completely symmetric assumption to that in the two-manufacturer, many-retailer case above: there, the model structure implies that any independent retailer that does not "win the auction" and acquire a manufacturer's product to sell in effect is not in the market either.
is available to sell without manufacturers as the suppliers; hence, channels are either delegated or nonexistent. Clearly, since delegation produces positive channel profits, it is the unique equilibrium. The only unresolved issue is the nature of fixed fees and transfer prices.
Given the symmetric bargaining positions of manufacturers and retailers, the size of the fixed fee (which determines the split of total channel profits) is not uniquely defined in equilibrium. However, given any fixed fee and per-unit transfer price, there is an incentive for the manufacturer and retailer to renegotiate the contract until the per-unit transfer price is set to maximize total channel profits. To see this, suppose some fixed fee J; is negotiated which allocates some positive profits to each channel member. Suppose the payoff resulting from this f;and the associated transfer price w, is $ X for the retailer and $ Y for the manufa~turer.~ Then the retailer has an incentive to offer the manufacturer $ Y plus epsilon for the right to all channel profits, and the manufacturer has an incentive to offer the retailer $Xplus epsilon for the same right. Whatever the outcome of this negotiation, the channel then proceeds to make its pricing decisions to maximize total channel profit, as in the above cases. This cannot decrease (and in all nontrivial cases, will increase) the total channel profit pie, because it causes the channel to price in a coordinated way (cf. Jeuland and Shugan 1983) . While the ability to renegotiate may result in the existence of multiple profit-splitting schemes (i.e., multiple J;) in equilibrium, the uniqueness of delegation as an equilibrium channel structure is preserved. This holds true whether products are substitutes or complements and whether competition is pricebased or quantity-based; all it requires is concavity of the channel profit functions.
We thus conclude that in each of these cases the delegation equilibrium is a function neither of the number of competitors at either the manufacturing or retailing level, nor of the products' degree of substitutability or complementarity in demand. Instead, it arises because delegation gives a manufacturer the ability to become a Stackelberg leader.
Many Vertical Channel Levels
We have seen that delegating is the unique equilibrium, with a manufacturer and a retailer in each channel. Is it even better to allow more channel levels? To examine the issue, consider again the reason for delegating in our model. For simplicity, consider the two-manufacturer, many-retailer case (although the argument would go through symmetrically in the two-retailer, many-manufacturer case as well).
Delegating makes the manufacturer a Stackelberg leader relative to the retail level in our model (comparing centralization with one-level delegation). We have shown above that this is valuable because it commits the manufacturer to a reaction function which is profitable to him. Now, consider a delegated channel (where each product is sold from the manufacturer through a retailer to the final market). Then, given this delegated channel, each manufacturer has an incentive to "subdelegate" by setting up another intermediary level, since that makes the manufacturer a Stackelberg leader relative to the existing channel levels. This advantage of delegation logically continues ad injnitum, so that each manufacturer has a profit incentive to add layer upon layer of vertical middlemen to his channel. So we have:
PROPOSITION Delegation ad injnitum is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.
PROOF. See Appendix I. This is, of course, an unrealistic prediction: with a seemingly internally consistent set of assumptions, the competitive channel model predicts a channel structure which is never observed in the real world. However, it turns out that a restrictive, and quite unrealistic, assumption implicit in this and previous channels models is critical to the result: that of observability of channel pricing arrangements. We develop this notion further below.
Unobservable Agreements
For the purposes of illustration, let us again consider price competition between two manufacturers who market substitutes through independent retailers. As before, the logic of the following argument is valid for all the other market and demand structures considered above.
Suppose now that after announcing the transfer price leading to the decentralized equilibrium (pf, pi), manufacturer 1 offers retailer 1 a new, secret agreement superseding the original one. According to the secret agreement, retailer 1 gets a net profit o f t > 0 if he charges pT, which maximizes the profits to channel 1 given p i , and a lower profit if he charges any other price.'' In this case, the members of channel 1 do much better and the members of channel 2 do much worse. The important point here is that in no real world situation can manufacturer 1 make a credible commitment not to do just this. It is in his interest to make this agreement and he can always present another agreement first which the "cheating" one then supersedes. Now, note that pT = p , (pf), wherep, ( .)
is the reaction function of manufacturer 1. Since manufacturer 2 has similar incentives, this ability for opportunistic behavior will force the noncooperative firms back to the original reaction functions and the original equilibrium. Intuitively, the possibility of intrachannel collusion causes the contracting stage and the retail pricing stage of the game to collapse to one, so the original reaction functions remain valid (see Katz 1988 for a similar argument). So we have:
PROPOSITION With unobservable agreements, all subgame perfect equilibrium out-

comes are identical to the centralized Nash equilibrium outcome.
PROOF. See Appendix I. This means that, while delegation may be desirable to guarantee Stackelberg leadership, the end result for equilibrium pricing or quantity-setting is the same as in the centralized case. There are no strategic reasons for delegation to be more profitable than centralization; further, the unrealistic benefits of infinite channel length collapse without observability.
Discussion
We have used a two-step approach to re-analyze the problem of optimal distribution channel choice in a multiproduct market. First, using internally consistent modeling assumptions about the types of transfer prices possible, we find that delegation ad injinitum is the unique equilibrium. Second, once we remove the hidden (and unrealistic) assumption that channel pricing agreements are observable, we open the model to collusion between a manufacturer and his retailer, and this does not preserve the delegation equilibrium. If it is possible to "cheat," for instance through unobservable agreements, then even under delegation, the equilibrium price or quantity solution will degenerate to the centralized level. So with an internally consistent modeling structure, and under the most 'O For example, this secret offer may entail a transfer price of zero and a fixed fee equal to total profits minus 6. See also Shugan and Jeuland ( 1988) . general demand and market structures, we avoid the unrealistic prediction of infinite channel length." Contrary to results in the existing literature, factors such as demand substitutability or number of competitors appear to have no strategic bearing on decisions about vertical integration.
The empirical testing of this theory would require identifying industries with differing degrees of obsemability of competitive channels' transfer pricing arrangements. One might use as a proxy for obsemability the use of exclusive intermediaries in one region of the country versus in many regions. We would expect a multi-distributor manufacturer (but with territorial exclusivity) to have more observable transfer pricing arrangements than a single-distributor manufacturer, for two reasons. First, it is harder to "cut a deal" with many separate intermediaries than with just one, and the chances of such an underthe-table arrangement becoming public are greater with more parties involved. Second, antitrust laws force a manufacturer to offer comparable terms to all intermediaries, so "cheating" with individual distributors could pose legal costs for a manufacturer. Then, given this proxy, our theory would predict a higher likelihood of centralized-channel pricing levels in the single-distributor markets than in multi-distributor markets.
Note that the theory does not necessarily imply that we would observe shorter channel lengths in single-distributor markets-only that we would observe the prices corresponding to shorter channel lengths. Clearly, such a test would require controlling for such obvious factors as fixed costs of identifying and certifying intermediaries; competitive structure (are products substitutes or complements?); and competitive asymmetries in product lines, market knowledge, and the like. An integrated approach to theory testing, such as that used by Anderson (1985) , may best control for other factors while testing this prediction.
What do these findings suggest for future research on optimal channel choice? First, further generalizations of our modeling structure are possible, but may not produce useful managerial guidelines for channel structure. For instance, if we allow nonlinear (rather than constant, and hence linear) transfer prices, many things can happen. In particular, if a channel transfer price is allowed to depend on both the volume and the transfer pricing scheme of the other channel or on the volume of the other channel, then pricing schemes can be developed which produce any outcome, including the collusive one, as long as profits to both channels are nonnegative (Katz 1988; Fershtman, Judd and Kalai 1987) . Why then do we not see such arrangements? One compelling reason is that they are hard to verify legally, and thus cannot be binding. More importantly, this highlights the importance (and restrictiveness) of the assumption of observability for stability of channel transfer pricing.
Given the problems of making delegation credible, the choice of a channel structure may depend more importantly on the extent to which channel-specific investments enhance profitability, and the concomitant threat of free-riding by some channel members on others (Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986 ). These within-channel factors can both inhibit the willingness of potential channel partners to build a profitable relationship, and cement an already-existing relationship-despite any external moves by competitors. Some empirically-based work using transactions-cost theory to explain channel relationships indicates that this is a useful direction to pursue in future theory work (Anderson 1985; Anderson and Coughlan 1987) . One step in this direction is that taken by Wernerfelt (1988) .
" There are other factors that can restrict the optimal channel length to a finite number of middlemen, for example, a fixed cost of finding these middlemen. We are indebted to a reviewer for pointing this out. However, the existence of fixed costs does not vitiate our observability result: that unobservable channel pricing arrangements give manufacturers an incentive to price as in the Nash centralized equilibrium.
Further, these channel-specific factors highlight the dynamic nature of channel relationships. The static approach taken here and in the modeling literature to date is not sufficient to incorporate the ability of channel members to invest in the channel over time, or the ability of competitors to punish each other for noncooperative behavior. We suspect that these factors are important to consider in future channels modeling research.'' l 2 We would like to thank Abel Jeuland, Sridhar Moorthy, Richard Staelin, and the participants of the Marketing Workshop at the University of Rochester for discussions helping to clarify the paper.
Appendix I. Proofs
For simplicity of exposition, we will look at price competition between substitutes. Generalization to other cases will be obvious from the proofs and the example in Appendix 11. We write channel profits as two 
L E M M A 1 . It is never a subgame perfect equilibrium for no firm to delegate.
PROOF. From the first-order conditions ( I I := 0, 1 = 1, 2) and the implicit function theorem, we see that the reaction functions p,(pJ), i , j = 1, 2, j # i , have finite and positive slopes in pl -p2 space. Now consider a locus of points of equal profit for firm i , or an iso-profit curve: II,(pl, p2) = k . For k = II;, we have the isoprofit curves for each firm passing through the centralized equilibrium, (PC, p i ) . Let us now consider firm 2. The slope of its iso-profit curve in pl -p2 space can be derived as: dp2/dpl = -II:/II:. But at the centralized equilibrium, II: = 0, so that firm 2's iso-profit curve has infinite slope (i.e., a vertical tangent) there. By an analogous argument, firm 1's iso-profit curve has zero slope in pl -p2 space at the centralized equilibrium. So we have strictly positive and finite slopes for the reaction functions, but zero and infinite slopes for the iso-profit curves of firms 1 and 2, respectively, at the centralized equilibrium. Now because II: > 0, one way in which firm 2 can increase its profits is by itself picking some price that induces firm 1 to set a price on its reaction function, p l ( a ) ,which is greater than pi. Since the iso-profit curve IIi is C 2 ,there indeed exists a fi2 such that
I12(pl (h),&) > I12(pf,pg).By becoming a Stackelberg leader, firm 2 can pick that point o n p l ( p 2 ) . Q.E. D.
PROPOSITION Both firms delegate in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
1.
PROOF. By Lemma 1, we only need to wony about what a firm should do given that its opponent delegates. We thus assume that firm 1 has delegated. Obviously, agent 1's reaction curve depends on whether firm 2 delegates or not. Denote by A;'(p2)agent 1's reaction curve if firm 2 delegates, and denote by A f ( p 2 ) agent 1's reaction curve if firm 2 centralizes. If A f ( p 2 )2 A f ( p 2 ) ,then from the argument in Lemma 1, firm 2 can do better by clever delegation against A;'(.) than by accepting the follower point on A ? ( . ) . We therefore set out to prove that ~; ' ( p , ) 2 A f ( p 2 ) . T o this end, note that a cleverly chosen A 2 ( p l )has the property that A 2 ( p I ) > p 2 ( p l ) , because in a price game, firms have a profit incentive to commit to higher prices. So the optimal ~; ' ( p~) is designed to maximize firm 1's profits against higher prices than is AC(p2).Therefore, firm 1 will construct these transfer pricing contracts such that ~f ( p 2 )
PROPOSITION Delegation ad infiniturn is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.
PROOF. By repeated, sequential application of Lemma 1 and Proposition I. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION With unobservable agreements, all subgame perfect outcomes are identical to the centralized 3. Nash equilibrium outcome.
PROOF. Consider the decentralized equilibrium and suppose that a manufacturer can offer his distributor a second unobserved contract, superseding the first one. As long as all other contracts are unchanged, and all other players act as if the second contract does not exist, then our manufacturer and distributor can improve their joint payoff by a contract consisting of a lump sum and a transfer price equal to marginal cost. In effect, they can secretly revert back to the reaction function of the nondelegating manufacturer. The symmetry of the game guarantees that each manufacturer-distributor pair has this incentive to rewrite contracts under the table. The only equilibrium outcomes are therefore those of the original game between the nondelegating manufacturers, Q.E.D.
Appendix 11. An Example with Two Manufacturers and Many Retailers
We here look at two manufacturers, each of whom could retail at a fixed cost R 2 0, and many potential retailers, none of whom can manufacture but all of whom can retail at a fixed cost of zero. To make the results more transparent, we look at the game as played in three stages. First, the manufacturers decide whether to retail (i.e. to centralize) or not. Secondly, those who do not retail auction off retailing rights for fixed fees J and associated transfer prices w, ( i = 1, 2). Thirdly, there is retail competition in either prices or quantities.
We borrow the following linear demand curve from Deneckere (1983) :
where p, is the price of firm i's product, and q, is its volume. If the products are demand complements, E is positive, whereas E is negative if they are substitutes. We can invert (1) to get
Although (I) and (2) kink where p, = 0 and q, = 0, these kinks preserve concavity of the profit functions. Note that (2) is a generalized version of the demand function used in McGuire and Staelin (1983) . We further assume that production and marketing have a fixed cost of F and a (constant) variable cost of V. Without loss of generality, we set V equal to zero. Note that the fixed cost F will not affect any marginal decisions or optimal pricing or quantity decisions in the model.
(a) Price Competition Assume first that the firms compete on price. If the two manufacturers collude and act like a monopoly, the joint-profit-maximizing retail price is p ? = A/2. In the event that neither firm delegates, the industry acts as an ordinary Bertrand duopoly. Each firm then chooses price to maximize profits:
By straightforward calculation, we then find the equilibrium price and profits as:
These shall be important benchmarks. We call this game the pure centralized case.
We next assume that only firm 1 delegates, while firm 2 centralizes. In this case, retailer 1 and manufacturer 2 set their retail prices after firm 1 has announced w l ; and firm 1 of course takes this into account when calculating the optimal w,.We will call this the mixed case in what follows. Retailer 1 thus chooses the retail price for product 1 to maximize:
wheref, is the fixed fee which manufacturer 1 charges retailer 1 for the right to retail product 1. Manufacturer 2 sets his retail price to maximize:
Manufacturer 1, meanwhile, sets the transfer price GI in full knowledge of the reaction functions for both dl andfi2. Since competition among potential retailers will drivef' up until manufacturer 1 gets all of his retailer's economic rents, he picks GI to maximize not just manufacturer-level profits, but total channelprofits for product 1:
where he substitutes dl and fi's reaction functions for PI and in the maximization.
With this market structure, the optimal transfer price is:
while the equilibrium retail prices and profits are:
Because of appropriate setting of the fixed feef', retailer 1's economic profits are zero, even for R r 0. Finally, if both firms delegate, each retailer picks his retail price pp' to maximize:
The first-order conditions define the retailers' reaction functions, which the manufacturers take into account when setting transfer prices, w f and M)$. As with the delegating manufacturer in the mixed case, each manufacturer can set to extract his retailer's economic profits, so that he wishes to set the transfer price wp' to maximize not just his own profits, but total channel profits:
where he substitutes pp' and p,d's reaction functions for p f and p,d in the maximization. Here, we find equilibrium values of transfer prices, retail prices, and profits to be:
and again, the economic profits of each retailer are zero. We call this the pure delegated case. Note that the transfer price is higher for substitutes than in the mixed case.
Comparing the equilibria across the pure channel structures, we obtain the following result:
Result 1. Under price competition with a competitive retail level and a duopolistic manufacturing level, manufacturers prefer (on a profit basis) the pure delegated structure to the pure centralized structure for substitutes but not for complements.
PROOF. If the products are substitutes ( E < 0), algebraic comparison of the equilibrium values of p:', pp',and p f yields p f < pp' < p:'. If the products are complements ( E > 0), then we have pp'> p f > p:'. Because the manufacturer's objective function in all cases is to maximize total channel profits (since, in the delegated case, the manufacturer extracts the retailer's profits from him), proximity of the delegated or centralized (Bertrand) price to the monopoly price is all that is necessary to insure the superior channel profitability of one structure or the other. The proposition follows immediately. Q.E.D.
To understand this result, it is helpful to look at Figure 1 . Under price competition, delegation permits the manufacturers to play as Stackelberg leaders relative to the retail level of both firms and to commit to higher retail prices. This implies directly that the retail-price reaction functions of the retailers in the delegated case are shifted outward relative to those of the centralized (Bertrand) manufacturers, for either substitutes or complements in demand. Under either complementarity or substitutability, the manufacturers would like to use a channel structure causing their prices to approach the monopoly level; but note that the monopoly price is higher than the Bertrand price for substitutes, but lower than the Bertrand price for complements. Thus, committing to a higher retail price through delegation helps for substitutes, but hurts for complements.
But comparing the pure centralized and pure delegated cases is not enough to establish the unique perfect equilibrium. To do this, we need to compare channel profits in the mixed case to those in the two pure cases. The following result emerges: Result 2. Delegation by both manufacturers is the unique perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game under Bertrand competition, with a duopolistic manufacturer level and a competitive retailer level.
PROOF.
Comparison of the equilibrium profits in the pure centralized, mixed, and pure delegated cases yields the following inequalities: n! < fI I, f12 < n:'.That is, either manufacturer in the pure centralized case -. could make more profits by delegating (and hence inaugurating the mixed case); but this would make the other manufacturer the centralized manufacturer in the mixed case. The second ineaualitv guarantees that the centralized . . -manufacturer in the mixed case would also be better off delegating the retailing function, thus instituting the pure delegated case. Understanding these inequalities, both manufacturers will decide to delegate. Further, given that both manufacturers have decided to delegate, neither has a profit incentive to unilaterally (or even collusively) centralize. The proposition follows. Q .E .D . These two results are also found in McGuire and Staelin (1986) .
( b ) Quantity Competition
While quantity competition at first sight may seem to be an unreasonable assumption, it is in fact a very good description of many industries where capacity decisions are made with long time horizons, such as the auto industry (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983) or fashion retailing.13 Since our results for this case are quite different, it is important to analyze it separately.
In one women's specialty retail shop in Evanston, the authors discovered that stock for the upcoming season must be ordered several months in advance (from two months for domestically-made clothing to six or seven months for imported clothing). Once ordered, it is virtually impossible to re-order in time to get another shipment during the relevant season. Hence in essence, this specialty store retailer commits to a quantity several months in advance of the fashion season. This behavior is common to the entire industry, given the timing of fashion showings and the lead times for manufacture of goods. If the two manufacturers both centralize and collude, the monopoly quantity for each of the two products (set by maximizing the joint profit function) is q: ' = A(B -E)-'12. If instead they centralize but act noncooperatively, each sets quantity in a Cournot game to maximize:
The equilibrium quantity and profits are then:
In the mixed case, if firm 1 delegates (is the Stackelberg leader), while firm 2 centralizes, retailer 1 sets his quantity, GI, to maximize: f i-
where again, f; is the fixed fee paid by the retailer to manufacturer 1 for the right to retail product 1. Manufacturer 2 sets his quantity, Q2, to maximize his profits:
Reaction functions are as usual derived from the first-order conditions of these two maximizations. They express 4, and cj2 as functions of the transfer price GI and fixed parameters of the problem. Manufacturer 1 sets the transfer price GI, knowing the form of these reaction functions; his ability to extract retailer 1's profits by setting f,permits him to pick dl to maximize not just manufacturer-level profits but total channel profits:
where Q, and Q2 are replaced by the reacl.ion functions of retailer 1 and manufacturer 2. The optimal transfer price under a mixed channel structure and Cournot competition is then:
The optimal quantities and profits for the two products are:
q'l = A(2B + E)(2B2 -E2)-'12, while retailer 1's profits are zero.
A~( q i )
,,c;/qz(q,)
,/--, , , , -'
In the pure delegated case with Cournot competition, retailers pick quantity to maximize retail-level profits:
Each manufacturer takes into account both of the retailers' reaction functions when setting the transfer price wp'. Further, since J is set so that the manufacturer extracts all retail profits, the manufacturer sets wp' to maximize total channel profits:
where the retailers' reaction functions for qp' and q,d are substituted into the manufacturer's ~r o f i t function. With this channel structure, equilibrium transfer prices, quantities, and profits are: Again, note that retail-level profits are zero, since each manufacturer extracts his retailer's profits through the fixed fee J .
Then comparing the pure centralized and pure delegated equilibria in the Cournot case, we have the following:
Result 3. Under quantity competition with a competitive retail level and a duopolistic manufacturing level, manufacturers prefer (on a profit basis) the pure delegated structure to the pure centralized structure for complements but not for substitutes.
PROOF. For substitutable products (E < 0 ) , comparison of the equilibria shows that q: ' < qf < qp', while for complementary products ( E > 0), q: > qp' > q f . Because channel profit is being maximized by both manufacturers, the equilibrium quantity closest to the monopoly quantity indicates the most profitable pure channel structure; the result follows. Q . E . D . Figure 2 shows this result graphically. Since the equilibrium transfer prices ( w f ) are negative in the Cournot case, delegation causes higher quantities to be set than in the centralized case. In this sense, delegation permits the manufacturers to act as Stackelberg leaders relative to the retail level, and to commit to higher quantities. The reaction functions in the delegated case are thus shifted out relative to those in the centralized case, for either substitutes or complements in demand. This helps profitability in the case of complements, since it moves quantities closer to the monopoly level, but hurts profitability in the case of substitutes.
To establish the unique perfect channel equilibrium, as in the case of Bertrand competition, we must compare profits in the two "pure" channel structures to those in the mixed case. This produces the following result:
Result 4. Delegation by both manufacturers is the unique perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game under Cournot competition, with a duopolistic manufacturer level and a competitive retailer level.
PROOF. Comparing equilibrium profits in the pure centralized, mixed, and pure delegated cases, we find: n f < fi', fi2 < Ilf.In other words, either centralized manufacturer could improve his profit position by delegating, while the centralized manufacturer in the mixed case can do better by delegating as well. Further, neither manufacturer in a pure decentralized channel structure has a unilateral incentive to centralize. Q.E .D.
